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a  b  s  t r  a  c  t
In this  paper  we  analyze  the  role  played  by  self-conﬁdence,  modeled  as  beliefs  about  one’s
ability,  in  shaping  task  choices.  We  propose  a  model  in which  fully  rational  agents  exploit
all  the  available  information  to  update  their  beliefs  using  Bayes’  rule,  eventually  learning
their  true  type.  We  show  that  when  the  learning  process  does  not  converge  quickly  to  the
true ability  level,  small  differences  in initial  conﬁdence  can  result  in diverging  patterns
of  human  capital  accumulation  between  otherwise  identical  individuals.  If differences  in
self-conﬁdence  are  correlated  with  socio-economic  background  (as a large  body  of  empir-J24
J62
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ical  literature  suggests),  self-conﬁdence  can  be a channel  through  which  education  and
earning  inequalities  perpetuate  across  generations.  Our  theory  suggests  that  cognitive
tests  should  take  place  as early  as  possible,  in  order  to  avoid  that  systematic  differences
in self-conﬁdence  among  equally  talented  people  lead  to the  emergence  of gaps  in  the
accumulation  of  human  capital.
© 2012 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.Socio-economic status
1. Introduction
Gaps in economic outcomes (like educational attain-
ments and earnings) tend to persist across generations,
and it is well-known that parents’ socio-economic status is
usually a good predictor of the outcomes of their offspring.
Bowles, Gintis, and Osborne (2001) stress that “the
advantages of the children of successful parents go con-
siderably beyond the beneﬁts of superior education,
the inheritance of wealth, or the genetic inheritance of
cognitive ability.” They argue that the inclusion of vari-
ables comparable to what now goes under the label of
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0272-7757/$ – see front matter ©  2012 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.econedurev.2012.06.002“non-cognitive skills” can help explaining a larger frac-
tion of the variance of earnings.1 They also claim that
the contribution of parental socio-economic status to their
offspring’s earnings is partly determined by such non-
cognitive skills, genetically transmitted or learned from
parents that act as role models.
Since then many other authors have emphasized the
role played by non-cognitive skills; the most recent lit-
erature tends to treat them as inputs that enter the
“black-box” of the skill production function. Cunha and
Heckman (2007) propose a particular formulation of the
technology of skill formation featuring self-productivity
1 Brunello and Schlotter (2011) deﬁne non-cognitive skills as “personal-
ity  traits that are weakly correlated with measures of intelligence.” While
in  some papers the orthogonality between the two types of skills derives
from statistical conditions that ensure identiﬁcation in classical factor
analysis, Deke and Haimson (2006) do ﬁnd that key personality traits are
rather poorly associated both with cognitive skills and among themselves,
while the correlation among measures of cognitive skills is much stronger.
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nd dynamic complementarity among a multidimensional
ector of cognitive and non-cognitive skills. They argue
hat insufﬁcient investment in some of these skills early
n life has long-lasting consequences that are very difﬁcult
r costly to revert. Heckman, Stixrud, and Urzua (2006),
unha and Heckman (2007, 2008) and Cunha, Heckman,
nd Schennach (2010) have shown that gaps between chil-
ren from different backgrounds open up very early in life,
s soon as in pre-school age, and then tend to persist and
tay roughly constant over the lifetime. This ﬁnding clearly
ocates the rising of the problem in a period in which the
ole of the parents is the most important.
In this paper we want to analyze the role possibly played
y a single non-cognitive skill, namely self-conﬁdence, that
e deﬁne as the beliefs over one’s unknown level of cogni-
ive ability. Hence, our model entails the simplest possible
ultidimensional vector of skills, containing only two ele-
ents: a cognitive skill (innate ability) and a non-cognitive
ne (self-conﬁdence). The use of such a framework is nei-
her meant to deny the importance of other skills, nor to
gnore the well-established fact that cognitive and non-
ognitive abilities are multidimensional in nature, nor to
ownplay the interaction among them. It simply reﬂects
ur goal to isolate and highlight a very speciﬁc mechanism,
.e. the role that self-conﬁdence plays by distorting task
hoices. In other words, our purpose is to go into the “black-
ox” of the skill production function, identifying a precise
nd speciﬁc channel through which inherited differences in
elf-conﬁdence can endogenously (i.e. through individual
hoices) explain the emergence and persistence of gaps in
he accumulation of human capital. Heckman et al. (2006)
recisely quantify the role played by non-cognitive skills.
n their empirical model, they assume that a single latent
actor captures cognitive ability, and that another single
atent factor captures non-cognitive ability.2 Their empiri-
al measures of non-cognitive skills are scores in the Rotter
ocus of Control Scale and in the Rosenberg Self-Esteem
cale, which are both clearly linked to the concept of self-
onﬁdence.3 They show that, even though cognitive ability
xplains a larger share of wage variance, non-cognitive
bility is similarly important, since moving persons from
he top to the bottom of the distribution has similar effects
or both types of skills.
The working idea of our model is that, by acting as role
odels, parents transmit to their children beliefs about
heir (unknown) ability. Such beliefs affect educational
hoices and, through this channel, contribute to widen
he gap in human capital accumulation while the learning
rocess (of actual ability) proceeds. The consequences of
2 Heckman et al. (2006) also assume independence between latent cog-
itive and non-cognitive abilities. Such assumptions have then be relaxed
n  Cunha and Heckman (2008) and Cunha et al. (2010),  who  use a wider
ange of psychological measures, mainly related to social behavior and
ehavioral problems.
3 In particular, self-esteem reﬂects a person’s overall evaluation or
ppraisal of his or her own  worth, encompassing beliefs and emotions.
ocus of control is instead deﬁned as the extent to which individuals
elieve that they can control events that affect them: people with an exter-
al  locus of control tend to think that luck or fate (rather than their own
ctions) are the main determinants of success or failure, and this is likely
o  be related to low levels of conﬁdence in own ability.ucation Review 31 (2012) 824– 834 825
initially “wrong” beliefs can thus have long lasting effects,
even if agents eventually learn their true level of ability.
For self-conﬁdence to have important effects we  do not
need to assume that agents enjoy holding a good image
of themselves (i.e. that self-conﬁdence enters directly
the utility function), something that would imply that
some degree of overconﬁdence is optimal.4 Our theoreti-
cal framework assumes full rationality, given that agents
extract all the available information from the signals
received in order to update their beliefs, and this implies
that they eventually learn their true type. Similarly, we
exclude any other form of self-deception. The Bayesian
learning mechanism is based on observing success or fail-
ure in the endeavor undertaken, given that the probability
of success depends on the true level of ability as well as on
the difﬁculty of the task, which is chosen endogenously in
accordance with (updated) beliefs about one’s ability.
We ﬁnally simulate the model with a bootstrapping
procedure, showing that choices distorted by under-
conﬁdence (while all the other sources of heterogeneity
are neutralized) lead to a signiﬁcant gap in the accumu-
lation of human capital during the learning process of the
true level of ability. As long as it correlates with the family
background, self-conﬁdence constitutes therefore a chan-
nel through which gaps in educational attainments and
earnings perpetuate across generations. This ﬁnding also
helps to explain why the early gaps based on the socio-
economic background do not narrow when the role of the
family becomes less important relative to other factors (like
school and teacher quality, or peers’ characteristics). This
also suggests that policies aimed at providing early and
accurate feedbacks on the cognitive skills of disadvantaged
children can be important in promoting inter-generational
income mobility.
The outline of the paper is as follows. In Section 2 we
compare our theoretical approach with others in the lit-
erature. We also provide evidence supporting both the
importance of the role played by self-conﬁdence and
the correlation between self-conﬁdence and family back-
ground. In Section 3 we  present a simple and parsimonious
theoretical model that highlights how self-conﬁdence can
affect the accumulation of human capital via task choice.
In Section 4 we  run a simulation of our model in order to
better assess its implications in terms of the emergenge of
gaps in educational attainments between people from dif-
ferent backgrounds. Section 5 comments upon the results
and draws some conclusions.
2. Motivation
In this section we survey the related theoretical and
empirical literature to motivate the relevance of our work.
In Section 2.1 we  document how incorrect beliefs about
ability are indeed very common, and we discuss the possi-
ble consequences of this fact. Moreover, we motivate our
choice to focus on a deﬁnition based on the levels of beliefs,
4 Such an assumption is quite common in the behavioral economics
literature (e.g. in Köszegi, 2006 and Weinberg, 2009). We discuss this issue
in more details in Section 2.2.
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As long as the true level of ability is a point estimate, asFig. 1. Netherlan
rather than on their precision. In Section 2.2 we discuss an
assumption commonly made in the literature, i.e. that peo-
ple actually care about their beliefs, and explain why we
decided not to make this assumption. Finally, in Section 2.3
we justify an important implicit assumption of our model
by providing evidence that suggests the existence of a rele-
vant link between self-conﬁdence and the socio-economic
background.
2.1. Imperfect knowledge of one’s ability
We deﬁne self-conﬁdence as the beliefs an agent holds
about his own  ability, following Bénabou and Tirole (2002),
Hvide (2002), Köszegi (2006), Sjögren and Sällström (2004),
and Weinberg (2009) among others. This deﬁnition is based
on the assumption that ability is unknown to the agent
instead of being his private information as in standard sig-
naling models.5
There is an extensive literature showing that agents
hold a rough estimate of their cognitive skills. Dunning,
Heath, and Suls (2004) survey the psychological literature
documenting the presence of a weak correlation between
actual and perceived performance in several domains,
while Falk, Huffman, and Sunde (2006) provide experimen-
tal evidence that people are substantially uncertain about
their relative ability and that this has indeed important
consequences on search decisions.
5 Along this dimension, our approach differs from that of Keane and
Wolpin (1997), who propose a structural model in which individual ability
in  the initial period is assumed to be exogenously given and known by the
agents.), Italy (bottom).
In Fig. 1 we  plot the distribution of PISA 2006 test scores
across pupils enrolled in different high-school tracks. Com-
paring the top and the bottom panel (which refer to the
Netherlands and Italy, respectively) we  see quite a differ-
ent degree of overlapping in the two  countries. The main
difference between the two educational systems is that
in Italy students and parents are perfectly free to choose
the high-school track, while in the Netherlands there is
a nationwide standardized aptitude test,6 administered at
age 12, that has gained a considerable inﬂuence in recom-
mending the secondary track most suitable for the pupil.
While we recognize that there might be many other rea-
sons to choose different tracks, the level of ability should
also play an important role. Fig. 1 shows that the degree of
overlapping across tracks, which should in part be driven
by ability mismatch, is much more pronounced in Italy,
where students receive less precise signals about their
ability.
Another important issue is the deﬁnition of conﬁdence
in terms of the mean vs. the spread of the distribution of
beliefs.7 The former implies that an overconﬁdent holds too
high an estimate of his ability. The latter refers to an evalu-
ation that is too precise, and better ﬁts a situation in which
an investor underestimates the variance of future returns.in our case, it would be meaningless to talk about over- or
underconﬁdence in these terms.
6 The so-called Cito test.
7 Both deﬁnitions are used in the literature. The ﬁrst by Hvide (2002),
Bénabou and Tirole (2002), and Weinberg (2009), among others; the sec-
ond by Sjögren and Sällström (2004). Köszegi (2006) and Belzil (2007) use
both.
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self-evaluation of their math ability: this ﬁnding may be
due to differences in reference groups (the so-called “big
ﬁsh, small pond effect”).A. Filippin, M. Paccagnella / Econom
The focus on the level rather than on the precision of
eliefs is one of the main difference between our model
nd the one proposed by Sjögren and Sällström (2004).  A
econd major difference is that, in our framework, agents
ventually discover their true type, while in Sjögren and
ällström (2004) agents can remain “trapped” with wrong
eliefs due to insufﬁcient experimentation and learning.8
Imperfect information about ability is conceptually very
imilar to imperfect information about the market returns
o education due to incomplete information.9 This aspect
as been recently investigated by Nguyen (2008),  Attanasio
nd Kaufmann (2009),  Kaufmann (2010) and Jensen (2010),
ith a particular focus on developing countries. How-
ver, a model in which agents have biased information
n expected returns correlated with family background,
ould be observationally equivalent to our model only as
ar as initial decisions are concerned. By making educa-
ional choices agents then receive many signals about their
bility, while the same does not happen about returns to
ducation. Therefore, the evolution of beliefs (and, as a con-
equence, the accumulation of human capital) would likely
e very different.
Our work is similar in spirit to a recent paper by
rachter (2011),  who also assumes imperfect knowledge of
cademic ability (and not of returns to education) and esti-
ates the option value contained in the choice of enrolling
n academic 2-year colleges, often used as stepping stones
oward 4-year colleges by students with initially low aca-
emic expectations.
.2. Self-conﬁdence in the utility function
In our paper we focus on the role that conﬁdence plays
hrough task choices and on how this channel shapes
uman capital acquisition. Self-conﬁdence has no direct
nﬂuence, as it would be if agents derived utility from
olding a positive self-image (Köszegi, 2006; Weinberg,
009). While such models rationalize many interesting
eatures of human behavior and show that moderate lev-
ls of overconﬁdence turn out to be optimal, we decide
o stick to a simpler theoretical framework in which this
oes not happen. The main reason is that once agents are
upposed to enjoy holding a good self-image, they should
lso be capable of tailoring the information acquisition
uring their learning process in such a way to preserve
t, for instance by means of beliefs that are “pragmatic”
Hvide, 2002) or, more generally, self-serving, as well as
ith selective memory (Bénabou & Tirole, 2002).10 Manip-
lating the information acquisition can only be effective
n the short run,  with the only transitory effect of slowing
8 To achieve this result, they have to assume the existence of non-
nformative tasks, in which the probability of success is equal to one.
9 This can be seen as a possible application of robust control models à la
ansen and Sargent (2001), in which agents take rational choices having
n imperfect knowledge of the state of nature.
10 Bénabou and Tirole (2002) also assume that discount rates are lower
t  shorter horizons than at more distant ones (time-inconsistency).
elzil (2007),  however, ﬁnd a predominance of the future component of
ntertemporal utility over the present component in schooling decision,
nd interpret it as evidence supportive of the standard time-consistent
odel.ucation Review 31 (2012) 824– 834 827
down the learning process, unless agents end up stuck in a
self-conﬁrming equilibrium in which the learning process
reaches a ﬁxed point.11 Although such an outcome can-
not be excluded, we ﬁnd more interesting to analyze the
effect of holding a wrong self-image when agents eventu-
ally discover their true type. We  therefore prefer to adhere
to a framework in which agents are characterized by stan-
dard preferences and unbiasedly exploit all the available
information.
2.3. The inter-generational transmission of conﬁdence
Recent empirical ﬁndings provide support for one of
the key assumptions of our model, namely that self-
conﬁdence is correlated with family background. Cesarini,
Johannesson, Lichtenstein, and Wallace (2009), using
Swedish data on a sample of twins and deﬁning overconﬁ-
dence as the difference between the perceived and actual
rank in cognitive ability, argue that genetic differences
explain 16–34% of the variation in overconﬁdence, and that
common environmental differences explain an additional
5–11%. A series of studies on different longitudinal UK
datasets (collected in Goodman & Gregg, 2010) ﬁnd a strong
intergenerational correlation not only in cognitive skills,
but also in a variety of attitudes that can be considered
proxies of conﬁdence. In particular, Gregg and Washbrook
(2011) ﬁnd that, even controlling for family background
and prior attainment, children are more likely to perform
well in tests at age 11 if they have strong beliefs in their own
ability and a more internal locus of control, and that chil-
dren from poorer families are less likely to possess these
attributes. Chowdry, Crawford, and Goodman (2011) ﬁnd
that richer parents have higher expectations about their
children’s educational attainments and that young peo-
ple from poorer families have lower ability beliefs, a more
external locus of control and lower educational aspirations
and expectations. After controlling for attainment at age 11,
15% of the socio-economic gap in attainment at age 16 is
accounted for by children’s attitudes, and an additional 12%
by parents’ attitudes.12 Chevalier, Gibbons, Thorpe, Snell,
and Hoskins (2009) ﬁnd that working class undergradu-
ates underestimate their performance relative to others,
but also that working class secondary school pupils are rel-
atively more conﬁdent and have a relatively more positive11 Models in Köszegi (2006) and Weinberg (2009) are characterized by
a  small number of periods. Hvide (2002) justiﬁes pragmatic beliefs in the
long run with a thought experiment in which “the agent takes into account
what pays rather than what is true.”
12 Starting from Lazear (1977), some authors have considered educa-
tion as a normal consumption good. As long as ability is also positively
correlated with family background, this would constitute an alternative
mechanism capable of explaining the positive correlation between fam-
ily  background, conﬁdence, and the persistence of gaps in educational
outcomes. However, the fact that the results of Chowdry et al. (2011)
are observed during compulsory education constitutes evidence in favor
of  a direct inter-generational transmission of conﬁdence rather than an
indirect effect mediated by tastes for schooling, which are more likely to
matter for tertiary education enrollment.
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In what follows we provide additional evidence about
the link between socio-economic background and self-
conﬁdence using data from the OECD-PISA study. This
dataset contains what we believe to be a good proxy for
self-conﬁdence, namely “Science Self-Efﬁcacy,” an index
built from student’s answers to questions about the ease
with which they believe they could perform eight science-
related tasks. This variable is a good proxy for beliefs about
academic ability because it is meant to go “beyond how
good students think they are in subjects such as science.
It is more concerned with the kind of conﬁdence that is
needed for them to successfully master speciﬁc learning
tasks, and is therefore not simply a reﬂection of a student’s
abilities and performance” (OECD, 2009).13
We  regress science self-efﬁcacy on the PISA index of
economic, social and cultural status, adding controls at the
individual, school and family level; results are presented in
Table 1.
The relationship between self-efﬁcacy and family back-
ground is statistically signiﬁcant and positive (as expected)
and convex. In the second column we control for the score
obtained by the student in the Science section of the test.
This is a proxy for “true” ability, comparable across stu-
dents in different countries and unobserved by the student
at the time of ﬁlling in the questionnaire. The inclusion of
the PISA score captures some variance of self-efﬁcacy, but
the positive relationship with family background remains
strong. Notice that controlling for the PISA score is likely to
bias downward the role played by self-conﬁdence, because
if our model is correct the PISA score already encompasses a
gap in the human capital accumulated up to that point and
that is partly due to differences in self-conﬁdence itself. In
other words, two students with the same innate ability but
characterized by a different initial self-conﬁdence should
also display a different PISA score.
Adding further controls at the student level (column
3) and at the parent and school level (column 4) does
not change signiﬁcantly the results, which we interpret as
suggestive evidence that family background has a direct
impact on self-conﬁdence, over and above the one operat-
ing through the transmission of cognitive skills.14
3. The model
In this section we present a multi-period model based
on the assumptions already discussed in Sections 2.1–2.3.
Agents choose a task on the basis of their beliefs, which are
updated in a Bayesian manner after observing the outcome
of every choice. Our purpose is to highlight the role played
13 See Ferla, Valcke, and Cai (2009) for a discussion on the differences
between Self-Efﬁcacy and Self-Concept. Since Self-Efﬁcacy solicits goal-
referenced evaluations and does not ask students to compare their ability
to  that of others, we believe it is a better proxy for the notion of conﬁdence
that we use in the model of Section 3.
14 We obtained similar results using a sample of Bocconi students, a
much more homogeneous population at a later stage of their academic
career. Results are not reported to save space but are available upon
request and are consistent with recent ﬁndings by Delaney, Harmon, and
Redmond (2011).ucation Review 31 (2012) 824– 834
by conﬁdence in explaining educational attainments via
task choice.
As already explained, we  assume that children do not
know their own  ability a and hold a belief represented
by the density function (a). We  deﬁne conﬁdence as
the perceived ability ˆ(a) =
∫
a(a)da, and underconﬁ-
dent a student who underestimates her ability: ˆ(a) < a.
Similarly, the overconﬁdent is characterized by ˆ(a) > a.
Students make educational choices by choosing “tracks”
( ). We  think of tracks as a rather general concept,
encompassing either “real” school tracks (e.g. academic vs.
vocational high schools) or any goal that the student sets
herself. In the latter sense, for instance, a student choos-
ing a more difﬁcult “track” could be a student choosing to
study for many exams at the same time (with the “risk” of
failing or doing poorly in all of them), or choosing to delve
into a subject by devoting a lot of time to it (with the “risk”
of not getting that much out of it in the end).
Under both interpretations, more difﬁcult tracks are
more costly in terms of effort, but they also yield higher
payoffs in case of success. A failure could be interpreted
either as a true failure in a “real” track (e.g. the student
drops out or must repeat a grade) or as the chance that,
in trying to deeply understand some difﬁcult material, the
student wastes energy and time, ending up learning less
than she would have done had she been less ambitious.
We assume that the probability of success is given by
p(s) = f (a, ) (1)
where   represents how difﬁcult is the track chosen. The
probability of success is assumed to be increasing in abil-
ity (f′(a) > 0) and decreasing in the difﬁculty of the track
(f′( ) < 0).
Students have then the possibility of updating their
beliefs using Bayes’ rule, when additional information can
be derived from the outcome of their choice. Given a
generic density of prior beliefs (a), posterior beliefs after
receiving the signal implicit in the outcome o = {s ; f} are
equal to:
(a|o) = p(o)(a)∫
p(o)(a)da
. (2)
Successful outcomes (s) in the track chosen allow the
agents to add human capital k( |s) to working life produc-
tivity, and agents maximize their instantaneous utility by
choosing the track that optimally balances the expected
acquisition of human capital with a convex cost of acquiring
it U[p(s)k( ) − 2], given their conﬁdence about unob-
served ability.
If the track chosen is totally uninformative (p(s) = 1)
the student does not gather evidence that contradicts her
wrong beliefs. For instance, this may  happen when there
is a discrete set of tracks and the less able students self-
select into the easiest track characterized by no probability
of failure. This is admittedly a limit situation, and therefore
we prefer to concentrate on what happens to the gap in the
accumulation of human capital when agents do learn from
observed outcomes and proceed with Bayesian updating of
their beliefs until their conﬁdence eventually converges to
the true value of ability.
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Table 1
Results: science self-efﬁcacy.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Baseline Pisa score Effort Parents
Index of socio-ec. status 0.318*** 0.145*** 0.111*** 0.119***
[0.014] [0.014] [0.015] [0.026]
Index of socio-ec. status2 0.033*** 0.022* 0.030** 0.026
[0.009] [0.009] [0.009] [0.014]
Female −0.157*** −0.141*** −0.157*** −0.031
[0.012] [0.011] [0.011] [0.017]
PISA  score in science 0.004*** 0.004*** 0.003***
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
Out  of school – science 0.112***
[0.009]
Self  study – science 0.114***
[0.006]
Interest in learning science 0.226***
[0.012]
Personal value of science 0.222***
[0.013]
Parents’ value of science 0.001
[0.013]
Science career motivation −0.029**
[0.009]
Science activities at age 10 0.062***
[0.008]
School-level characteristics No No No Yes
R2 0.119 0.230 0.255 0.355
Observations 225,098 225,098 216,304 29,970
BRR standard errors in brackets. All regressions include country dummies and controls for immigrant status, tracking and the interaction between tracking
and  the socio-economic status. In column 4 we  also control for school-level variables like school size, student-teacher ratio, ability sorting and a dummy
for  public schools.
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k( , (a), a|s) =  
1 + f (m) , (4)
16 The probability of success that characterizes our model implies that* p < 0.1.
** p < 0.05.
*** p < 0.01.
To achieve this goal we make some simplifying assump-
ions. First, we assume that the probability of success is
inear in ability. The reason is that, as anticipated in Section
.1, we concentrate on the role played by the level of one’s
erceived ability and not by the precision of such belief.15
ence, the probability of success is deﬁned as:
(s) = a  + (1 − ). (3)
This speciﬁcation implies that the importance of abil-
ty is proportional to the difﬁculty of the track. Notice
hat for the probability of success to be properly deﬁned
bility must have a ﬁnite support. For the sake of sim-
licity we assume a ∈ [0, 1] and   ∈ (0, 1]. The extreme
alue  = 0 would correspond to the case mentioned above
15 This is a major difference with respect to the model in Sjögren and
ällström (2004), who  assume that the probability of successfully acquir-
ng skills of type c1 is p(s) = ac1 , where a ∈ [0, 1] is the agent’s unknown
bility, while c1 measures the ability elasticity of success. In such a frame-
ork the precision of the signal is crucial, because uncertainty about
bility makes riskier options more or less attractive depending on whether
he probability of success is convex or concave in ability. For instance,
hat could happen with a convex probability of success is that a totally
ncertain agent could think to have more chances of succeeding than an
gent characterized by quite a precise belief of being above the average.
e  chose to remove such discontinuities by assuming linearity in ability
n  Eq. (1) and to focus on the effect of the level of conﬁdence.in which ability does not matter and the signal is totally
uninformative.16
We  also assume that more difﬁcult tracks allow stu-
dents to acquire more human capital if successful, and in
particular that the level of capital is equal toour agents make decisions under uncertainty. Our work can thus be linked
to  the literature that regards education as a risky investment and that
investigates the role played by risk aversion. Belzil (2007) notes that the
degree of conﬁdence is a measure of ex-ante risk, caused by agents’ igno-
rance about own  ability. He ﬁnds evidence of frequent (but moderate)
over-estimation and cases of severe underestimation (particularly among
the  most able individuals). Belzil and Leonardi (2007) develop a dynamic
econometric model of sequential schooling decisions in which the dropout
rate depends on parental background, individual-speciﬁc heterogeneity
and individual-speciﬁc risk aversion, departing from a more standard
representative-agent framework. They ﬁnd that risk aversion can be a
deterrent to investing in education, but that differences in risk attitudes
account for a modest portion of the probability of entering higher edu-
cation. Trachter (2011) analyzes the effect of providing full insurance on
decisions about enrollment in postsecondary education. In his model, the
provision of insurance increases enrollment in 4-year colleges (which is
the riskiest option an individual can take) by 81%, and total enrollment
by 40%. In our framework, the effect of underconﬁdence would be con-
founded with that of risk aversion. We therefore prefer, in order to keep
the model more tractable, to isolate the role of conﬁdence by assuming
risk neutrality.
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where m = (a − aˆ) represents the mismatch between the
actual level of ability of the student (a) and the optimal
level of ability for that track, i.e. the level of ability that char-
acterizes a perfectly informed student that maximizes her
utility by choosing exactly that track (aˆ). We  assume that
f(0) = 0, i.e. that human capital concides with the difﬁculty
of the track when ability perfectly ﬁts. Alternatively, the
amount of human capital actually acquired is discounted,
with the shape of f(m) crucially affecting the results when
m /= 0. In particular, we assume that f′(|m|) ≥ 0 meaning
that neither under- nor overconﬁdence can increase human
capital beyond  . This assumption might appear counter-
intuitive at ﬁrst glance, but it has the great advantage of
preventing self-deception. Consider the case in which in
the same track the human capital is lower for the overcon-
ﬁdent successful student, because her ability is lower than
what optimal for such a track, while the opposite happens
for the underconﬁdent successful student. The possibility
of supplementing the human capital provided by the cho-
sen track with an ability higher than aˆ would imply that
there is room for self-deception, i.e. that systematically
underestimating one’s ability might become an optimal
solution, with a consequent bias in the choice of the track
(a bias we want to avoid for the reasons outlined in Section
2.2). Of course, the effect of the mistake in evaluating abil-
ity does not need to be symmetric. In the simulation below
we will assume that underconﬁdence has no effect (f(m) = 0
when m > 0), while overconﬁdence has a negative impact
(f′(|m|) > 0 when m < 0). To complete the picture, we assume
that a failure leaves the stock of human capital unchanged,
i.e. k( , (a), a|f) = 0.17
Students are free to self-select into different tracks given
the best estimate of their ability, trading off a lower human
capital in case of success with a higher probability of acquir-
ing it. If ability was known, the ﬁrst-order conditions would
imply18:
 ∗ = 1
2
1
2 − aˆ . (5)The presence of f(m) in Eq. (4) implies that it is
always optimal to truthfully report one’s unknown abil-
ity (i.e. to set the mistake ˆ(a) − a = 0). Hence, the optimal
track choice becomes an increasing function of conﬁdence.
17 This assumption is made without loss of generality as compared to the
case in which the human capital accumulated in case of failure is positive
but  strictly lower: k( , (a), a|s) > k( , (a), a|f).
18 To analyze the role played by self-conﬁdence in shaping the gap in
educational attainments when agents are eventually learning their true
level of ability we need to iterate this choice for several periods. In princi-
ple, we  should compute the optimal track choice by maximizing a lifetime
utility function. Since additional information about one’s ability is valu-
able per se as long as it helps making better choices in the future, agents
could be willing to pay a price to receive a more informative signal, by
choosing a track slightly different than what would be optimal in a static
framework. However, such an effect is of a second order magnitude in
our  framework and it does not determine appreciable changes in the
results (see footnote 24 below), thereby not justifying the corresponding
increase in the complication of the model. Hence, we assume that agents
are myopic and that they maximize their expected utility period by period.
Alternative theoretical approaches in which the information value of the
educational or working choice is instead crucial have been proposed by
Jovanovic (1979), Miller (1984), and more recently by Trachter (2011).ucation Review 31 (2012) 824– 834
However, even removing any bias in the self-evaluation
of ability, ˆ(a) and aˆ may  still differ due to insufﬁcient
information. Eq. (5) therefore implies that both under- and
overconﬁdence determine a suboptimal track choice and a
loss of utility, as long as ˆ(a) /= aˆ.
The effect of under- and overconﬁdence can differ as far
as the accumulation of human capital is concerned. Rewrit-
ing conﬁdence as the composition of optimal ability and the
evaluation mistake ˆ(a) = aˆ+  m, expected human capital
is given by:
E(k) = −1
4
aˆ+ 2m − 3
(aˆ + m − 2)2(1 + f (m))
. (6)
The relationship between conﬁdence and human capital
can be summarized by means of the derivative of E(k) with
respect to the mistake m:
∂E(k)
∂m
= 1
2
m − 1
(aˆ + m − 2)3(1 + f (m))
+ 1
4
(aˆ + 2m − 3)f ′(m)
(aˆ + m − 2)2(1 + f (m))2
. (7)
As long as small ability mismatches have a negligi-
ble impact (i.e. as long as f′(0) is sufﬁciently small), the
derivative is positive around m = 0 for every value of a ∈ [0,
1]. This means that a small degree of overconﬁdence
(m > 0) increases the amount of expected human capital,
although at a price of lower utility because the increase
of human capital would be acquired overestimating the
expected return on the additional effort.19 As overcon-
ﬁdence increases, the sign of ∂E(k)/∂m depends on the
magnitude of the effect of the mismatch. In the limit case
in which there is no effect, e.g. when f(m) = 0 in Eq. (4),  or
in any case when such an effect is negligible, the human
capital acquired would monotonically increase with over-
conﬁdence, since the positive effect of a higher human
capital acquired in the case of success dominates the neg-
ative effect of a lower chance that this event happens.
In contrast, if the effect of overevaluating one’s ability
increases substantially with the size of the mistake (e.g. if
f(m) = m2), the relationship between expected human cap-
ital and overconﬁdence becomes bow-shaped. As far as
underconﬁdence is concerned, the condition that ensures
that there is no incentive to self-deception is also sufﬁ-
cient to grant that human capital decreases monotonically
as underconﬁdence increases.Agents update their beliefs given the signal (success
or failure) received at the end of each period.20 In order
to characterize the learning process and to investigate
19 The reason is that the probability of success depends on the true level
of  ability, and overconﬁdence would grant a higher level of human capital
when successful, but a positive outcome is less likely to happen than what
an  overconﬁdent agent expects.
20 Note that if the agent received a perfectly informative signal (like the
exact amount of human capital acquired when successful) he could invert
k( ,  (a), a|s) deriving with certainty her true ability level. However, data
suggest that uncertainty about ability survives a long string of signals,
which must therefore be not perfectly informative (or, if they are perfectly
informative, agents cannot fully exploit them). In what follows we assume
that agents only observe the event success vs. failure. In other words,
ics of Education Review 31 (2012) 824– 834 831
t
w
s
t
t
i
g
o
i
B
t

w

s
a
t
t
p
d
s
d
w
d
d
i
r
s


r
c
i
t
w
a
a
s
s
d
p
a
v
e
tA. Filippin, M. Paccagnella / Econom
he effect of self-conﬁdence on educational attainments
e need to specify how beliefs about one’s ability are
haped. The Beta distribution perfectly ﬁts our assump-
ion of a ﬁnite support of the ability distribution, necessary
o ensure that the probability of success is linear in abil-
ty. At the same time the Beta distribution is sufﬁciently
eneral to allow prior beliefs to represent different levels
f conﬁdence while keeping the whole domain of abil-
ty in their support, something necessary because with a
ayesian learning process agents can never assign a posi-
ive probability to events excluded by the prior.
The density function of the Beta[˛, ˇ] distribution is:
(a) = a
˛−1(1 − a)ˇ−1∫ 1
0
a˛−1(1 − a)ˇ−1da
, (8)
hile the mean is given by:
ˆ (a) =
∫ 1
0
a(a)da = ˛
 ˛ + ˇ . (9)
When  ˛ =  ˇ > 1 the distribution is symmetric and bell-
haped. The distribution is skewed to the left when  ˛ >  ˇ > 1,
nd to the right when  ˇ >  ˛ > 1.21 The higher  ˛ and ˇ,
he lower the variance and therefore the more precise
he beliefs. We  assume that ability is distributed in the
opulation following a Beta[2.5, 2.5], and that the same
istribution also characterizes the beliefs of the median
tudent. This is equivalent to assume that the median stu-
ent (a = 0.5) holds correct beliefs about her ability, because
hen (a) ∼Beta[2.5, 2.5] conﬁdence is ˆ(a) = 0.5.
Before analyzing the effect of over- and underconﬁ-
ence let us focus on the median student in order to
escribe in some details the learning process. After observ-
ng the outcome, the agent updates her beliefs using Bayes
ule. In particular, her posterior beliefs after observing a
uccess are:
(a|s) = ( a + 1 − )(a)∫ 1
0
( a + 1 − )(a)da
. (10)
By contrast, if a failure was observed:
(a|f ) = (  − a)(a)∫ 1
0
(  − a)(a)da
. (11)
The mass of probability is reallocated according to the
ealization of the signal, towards the upper bound if suc-
essful (see Fig. 2, right curve) and toward the lower bound
f not (see Fig. 2, left curve), keeping constant the support of
he density. Notice that the bad event has a stronger effect
hen updating beliefs.22
gents only know the potential amount of human capital  , but not the
ctual amount corrected for the ability mismatch 1 + f(m). An intermediate
ituation in which additional information can be extracted from a noisy
ignal of the level of human capital actually acquired (in other words when
ifferent degrees of success are observable) could be formalized at the
rice of a signiﬁcant increase in the complication of the model, but without
ppreciable additional insights. Hence, we prefer to stick to the simplest
ersion of the information structure.
21 The uniform is a special case of the Beta distribution when both param-
ters are equal to 1.
22 The reason is that a failure is far less likely given the speciﬁcation of
he  model. In fact, the student with correct prior beliefs will revise herFig. 2. Beliefs updating of the median student after the ﬁrst signal.
The agent will then choose again the optimal track given
posterior beliefs, that will be further revised after observ-
ing the outcome in the second period, and so on and so
forth. The bottom line is that, within the support of ini-
tial beliefs, the distribution of beliefs changes according to
the history of signals observed. Subsequent updates bring
beliefs closer and closer to the true ability level as long as
the agent receives informative signals.
4. Simulation
In order to study the effect of self-conﬁdence, we  com-
pare the choices made and the human capital accumulated
by an agent whose ability is a = 0.5 when she holds correct
prior beliefs on average ((a) ∼ Beta[2.5, 2.5]) against the
counterfactuals in which she is underconﬁdent and over-
conﬁdent, respectively. In other words, we  simulate the
model picking up the median student and looking at the
effect on her educational attainments of a wrong conﬁ-
dence in both directions. In fact, the higher human capital
accumulated when the student is not too overconﬁdent (i.e.
when the mismatch effect does not prevail) and successful
can be compensated by a probability of achieving it that is
lower for two reasons. First, because the track is more dif-
ﬁcult and therefore the same person is more likely to fail.
Second, because true ability is lower than conﬁdence. In the
utility maximization only the former is correctly internal-
ized, and the student will therefore be successful less often
than she expects. This is the engine that eventually drives
her conﬁdence towards the true level of ability.
conﬁdence upward a fraction 1 −0.5  of the times, while she will revise
her conﬁdence downward in the other 0.5  times. While her expected
posterior conﬁdence is always unchanged at 0.5, the upward and down-
ward revisions would be symmetric only when   = 1, i.e. when the two
events are equally likely.
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as long as conﬁdence converges towards the true type
and the cost of the mismatch decreases. Given the chosen
24 The speed of convergence of the two  types differs a little bit. In fact,
the mistake in conﬁdence becomes signiﬁcantly smaller for the overcon-
ﬁdent (p = 0.038). The reason is that the higher the track chosen, the more
balanced the probability of success given the true level of ability a = 0.5,
the more informative the signal. At ﬁrst glance this seems to imply that
the choice of track and the educational outcomes could have been differ-
ent had we internalized the different informativeness of the signals byFig. 3. Prior beliefs given the different levels of conﬁdence.
We  represent underconﬁdence with a distribution of
prior beliefs
(a)∼Beta[1.5, 3] (12)
skewed to the right. This implies a level of conﬁdence
ˆ(a) = 1/3, corresponding to the 24th percentile in the true
distribution.
Similarly, overconﬁdence is summarized by a distribu-
tion of prior beliefs
(a)∼Beta[3, 1.5] (13)
skewed to the left, which implies a level of conﬁdence
ˆ(a) = 2/3, corresponding to the 77th percentile in the
true distribution. These parameters also imply that the
three distributions have roughly the same variance, and
therefore that over- and underconﬁdence are perfectly
symmetric.23 Prior beliefs of the three different types of
student are summarized in Fig. 3. As far as the ability mis-
match described in Eq. (4) is concerned, we  choose no
correction in case of underconﬁdence (f(m) = 0 if m > 0) and
a quadratic term f(m) = 3m2 if m < 0, implying a discount of
about 7.5% in the human capital acquired in the ﬁrst period
by a successful overconﬁdent student.
We  analyze what happens to the human capital accu-
mulated by the three types of agents while the learning
process takes place, iterating the updating of beliefs 45
times. Since the single realization of human capital relies
upon a random component, we replicate the procedure 200
times.
Results show that the value of conﬁdence slowly con-
verges towards the true ability level for those starting with
23 Although the probability of success does not depend on the variance
of  beliefs, the latter could still affect the updating process, since the more
precise the beliefs, the lower the change of conﬁdence induced by the
same signal received. We do not want the learning pattern to be affected by
a  different precision of beliefs, and therefore we  assume the same variance
in the prior distributions.Fig. 4. Gap in the accumulation of human capital.
a wrong prior, but also that the learning process is far from
being completed. In fact, at the end of the 45th iteration
conﬁdence is about .425 for the underconﬁdent and .558
for the overconﬁdent, in both cases signiﬁcantly different
than .5 (p < 0.001).24
Fig. 4 displays the average gap, period by period, across
repetitions, in the accumulation of human capital of the
agents who start with wrong priors as compared to those
starting with correct beliefs. The human capital accumu-
lated by the underconﬁdent is signiﬁcantly lower than
the human capital acquired by the student holding cor-
rect beliefs (p < 0.001), while the opposite happens for
the overconﬁdent type (p < 0.001), although the magnitude
is different in absolute terms because of the cost of the
mismatch f(m). Notice that at the beginning, when over-
conﬁdence is larger (and so the cost of the mismatch), the
human capital accumulated is not much higher, while it
increases as compared to the student with correct beliefsmeans of dynamic optimization. In fact, there seems to be an additional
incentive to choose a higher track, thereby reducing the effect of under-
conﬁdence while increasing that of overconﬁdence. This is not the case,
however, because such an argument holds only when the probability of
success is computed knowing the true value of ability. When choosing ,
in  contrast, agents use the best estimate of their ability (a). Notice that
the perceived probability of success is increasing in (a). Hence, inter-
nalizing the different informativeness of the signal would imply a lower
revision of the optimal choice at low levels of ability. In any case, maxi-
mizing utility period by period implies choices that marginally differ in
terms of magnitude and therefore a negligible mistake particularly at low
levels of ability.
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peciﬁcation of the model, the gap between the overconﬁ-
ent and the underconﬁdent turns out to be about 6%.
To summarize, self-conﬁdence can determine signif-
cant differences in the outcomes observed. When the
earning process reaches the ﬁxed point implied by dis-
overing the true level of ability, the three types in the
imulation will start making the same choices and from
hat moment onwards they will be observationally equiv-
lent. However, the level of human capital acquired is and
ill remain signiﬁcantly different. Wrong beliefs about
ne’s ability do not need to be self-conﬁrming to explain
nequal outcomes if they lead to signiﬁcantly different
hoices during the learning process. As long as family
ackground shapes children’s beliefs about their ability,
onﬁdence can be a transmission mechanism that increases
he intergenerational persistence of outcomes.
Notice that in the model the probability of success
ncreases with innate ability only, while the human capi-
al accumulated plays no role. As already noticed in Section
.3, this simplifying assumption downplays the role of nur-
ure, since achievements are also determined by the whole
istory of intermediate outcomes, in turn also driven by
elf-conﬁdence. Therefore, what found by the model is once
ore a lower bound of the role of self-conﬁdence, since
he cumulative effect of the gap in the human capital accu-
ulated during the learning process of one’s ability is not
aken into account. The role of nurture therefore implies
hat tests meant to measure students’ ability are instead
apturing also the gap in human capital accumulated up
o that point because of a different family background.
or instance, a centralized test administered at age 15 in
rder to select students into different tracks would prob-
bly classify as different two students characterized by
he same innate ability but with a different background,
hereby helping to perpetuate intergenerational inequal-
ties. A policy implication arising from this consideration
s therefore that cognitive tests should take place as early
s possible in order to endow parents with measures of
he innate level of ability of the children that are not con-
ounded with the role that the family background can play
hrough self-conﬁdence.
. Conclusions
In line with some recent contributions, we claim that
he socio-economic background affects not only the actual
tock of cognitive skills possessed by a child (innate abil-
ty) but also the beliefs about such (unobserved) cognitive
kills, i.e. self conﬁdence. There is indeed a vast litera-
ure supporting the hypothesis that people have imperfect
nowledge of their ability and that many personality traits
elated to the concept of self-conﬁdence are inﬂuenced by
he family background in which a child grows up.
We provide further suggestive evidence about the link
etween conﬁdence and family background using the PISA
ataset, which is a representative cross-national survey of
5-year old pupils. We show that the link between back-
round and conﬁdence is strong and survives the inclusion
f good proxies for unobserved and observed ability. Our
roxies of ability are likely to bias downward the esti-
ated link between conﬁdence and background, since theyucation Review 31 (2012) 824– 834 833
capture not only innate ability, but also the gap in human
capital that has been accumulated up to that point.
We then propose a model in which fully rational agents,
who maximize the expected acquisition of human capi-
tal, choose tasks according to their perceived ability. True
ability and the difﬁculty of the chosen track affect the prob-
ability of success. After observing whether they succeed or
not, students update their beliefs, fully exploiting the avail-
able information, following Bayes’ rule. We  simulate the
model with a bootstrapping procedure and we show that
choices distorted by over- and underconﬁdence lead to a
signiﬁcant gap in the accumulation of human capital dur-
ing the process in which agents eventually learn their true
level of ability.
In our model agents do not derive additional utility by
holding a good self-image; the consequence of this assump-
tion is that if a perfectly informed and benevolent planner
could force individuals to choose the “right” task, the effect
of wrong conﬁdence would disappear. Nevertheless, even
in a setting in which agents are fully rational and have
standard preferences, a moderate degree of overconﬁdence
can be beneﬁcial in terms of the accumulation of human
capital over the life course, although at a price of a lower
utility (since overconﬁdent and underconﬁdent agents do
not make, by construction, utility-maximizing choices).
Underconﬁdence, on the other hand, is suboptimal in
terms of both utility maximization and human capital
accumulation.
The intergenerational transmission of beliefs can
thus constitute a further channel through which socio-
economic differences perpetuate from one generation to
the next. Even if two individuals had the same innate cog-
nitive ability, differences in beliefs would lead them to
make different choices in terms of investment in education.
The results of our analysis suggest that policy interven-
tions aimed at providing early and precise feedback about
the cognitive skills of children from disadvantaged back-
grounds can be beneﬁcial in helping to narrow the gaps
in educational attainments, by avoiding that equally tal-
ented people make different choices only because they
have inherited different beliefs about their potential.
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